Design and Implementation of Risk Analysis system for ISP Network by Moon, Ho-Kun et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
PACIS 2004 Proceedings Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems(PACIS)
December 2004
Design and Implementation of Risk Analysis
system for ISP Network
Ho-Kun Moon
KT Technology Laboratory
Jin Choe
KT Technology Laboratory
Dae-Hyun Ryu
Hansei University
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2004
This material is brought to you by the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been
accepted for inclusion in PACIS 2004 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Moon, Ho-Kun; Choe, Jin; and Ryu, Dae-Hyun, "Design and Implementation of Risk Analysis system for ISP Network" (2004).
PACIS 2004 Proceedings. 8.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2004/8
  92
Design and Implementation of Risk Analysis system for ISP Network 
Ho Kun Moon 
KT Technology Laboratory 
hkmoon@kt.co.kr 
Jin Gi Choe 
KT Technology Laboratory 
jingiya@kt.co.kr 
Dae Hyun Ryu 
Hansei University 
dhryu@hansei.ac.kr 
 
Abstract 
 
The need for more effective ways to analyze network risks in real time has been recognized by 
security planners. However, most existing risk analysis tools provide only methodological 
analysis procedures, and cannot reflect continually changing vulnerability and threat 
information concerning individual network systems in real time. For this reason, this study 
suggests a new system design methodology which shows a scheme to collect and analyze data 
from network intrusion detection systems and vulnerability analysis systems and estimates 
risk levels. Through field tests, it was proven that the proposed system can provide log 
analysis functions that help in reasoning out the behavior of an attacker. This paper includes 
a design concept, the main algorithm and test results. 
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1. Introduction 
Today, most Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have and operate various methods to 
effectively protect their assets, connected through networks, from all types of cyber attacks. 
At this stage, risk analysis methodology[1-8], which utilizes information about elements of 
vulnerability and threats to the network assets, is applied as a means to determine the 
protection method and level. 
In order to solve such problems, this study proposes a design plan for a system, which will be 
able to conduct real-time based risk analysis by correlating the information supplied from 
network assets value assessment, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (N-IDS) and 
Venerability Analysis Systems (or VAS). This rest of this paper is organized as follows: In 
chapter II, methods of estimating the value of the asset are explained. In chapter III, the 
structure, functions and analysis algorithm of the proposed system are explained. In chapter 
IV, the results of experiments of a network are described. Finally, conclusion and future 
research directions are suggested 
 
2. Asset Value Assessment Method 
As a part of the network risk management process, risk analysis starts from identifying the 
value (or importance) of the asset subject to protection by the security policy, and the 
vulnerabilities and threats faced by the asset. The vulnerabilities and threats become direct 
causes that generate risk and the asset value has the same meaning as the level of loss 
induced by the risk. The existing risk analysis methodologies consider the risk as the 
comprehensive attributes of asset, vulnerability and threat level and determine the risk level 
by combining these factors. 
 
  93
A c c e s s A c c e s s A c c e s s
D is t r ib u t io n D is t r ib u t io n
C o r e C o r e
IX O & M  S e r v e r  F a r m
S e r v ic e
S e r v e r  F a r m
 
 
* IX : Internet eXchange 
* O & M : Operation and Maintenance 
 (Fig. 1) General ISP Network Model 
 
However, categorizing assets, vulnerabilities and threat levels into only a few levels based on 
attributes, is problematic. The decision for risk level classification tends to mainly rely on 
subjective judgments. Also, when combining the asset value level, which is expressed in a 
form of quantitative estimation value, and vulnerability and threat level, which are expressed 
as step counts in descriptive form, the possible step counts increase and it becomes difficult 
to incorporate the characteristics of the ISP subjected to the risk analysis. Therefore, there is 
the problem of decreasing the objectivity of the results. Accordingly, the asset loss modeling 
technique, recommended by Ho Kun Moon [10] is adopted in this study in order to solve the 
above problem. Through this method, the asset value is expressed as a sum of service value 
generated through the asset and the physical fixed asset value. 
For example, a specific asset on network ka  has a fixed asset value of ),( xaV kf  in x  
year based on its purchasing point and if the generated service value in that year is ),( xaV ks , 
the total asset value of ka , ),( xaV kt  in x  year can be shown in the following formula (1). 
 
),(),(),( xaVxaVxaV kskfkt +=            (1) 
If the fixed amortization method is applied according to the accounting rules in depreciation, 
the value of ),( xaV kf decreases linearly each year and after five years, in typical ISP 
network equipment accounting standards, it converges to 0 or an arbitrary remaining value. 
After the purchase of the asset, the fixed asset value of ka in x year can be expressed by the 
following formula (2). 
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))0,((
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frkf
kf aVxnx
VaV
xaV ++
−−=   (2) 
Where, x : No. of passed year after purchase, 0>x  integer 
n : Remaining years 
nx + : Typically 5 years for ISP 
)0,( kf aV : Asset value at purchasing point 
frV  : Remaining asset value 
 
Through the individual assets on network ka , m  unit of services can be offered, and if the 
service value created by ka through the distribution of a particular service is ),( xaV kpsw , the 
entire service value created through ka can be shown as the following formula (3). 
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If the service value of the particular asset and fixed asset value has a relationship of 
ts VV 10> , st VV ≅  is approximated since the service value is a major element in entire asset 
value. However, calculating the aforementioned ),( xaV kpsw  in formula (3) is considerably 
difficult in an actual network. The reason is that the degree of contribution of an asset to 
generating individual service changes from time to time and it is nearly impossible to 
separate the particular service-related traffic amongst other traffic processed by each asset. 
Therefore, the asset loss modeling technique, suggested by Ho Kun Moon [7], uses a method 
that deduces each service value ),( xaV ks  of an asset generated annually. To achieve this, it 
incorporates the characteristics of the network that is a systematic combination of each asset 
and uses a reverse calculation approach to estimate the service value from individual asset 
components involved for the specific service, based on the revenue generated by the assets. 
Such approach is possible because the network has attributes, and: (1) All service users have 
to use the assets to access the network; and (2) the value of a high network layer service is 
larger or equal to than that of a low network layer service due to the layered structure of a 
network. Moreover, if the redundant design is not done, it can be assumed that the 
contributions of the network assets on the same network layer to a particular service are 
almost evenly proportioned to a year. Under this assumption, if the method to estimate the 
service value ),( xaV ks of individual assets in a given year is simply expressed, the value can 
be obtained as shown in (Table 1). 
 
(Table 1) Calculation for Total Asset value of Individual Asset 
Step 1) Identify the number ( m ) of entire services offered at the network and each service 
revenue ( ][tSv ).  
Step 2) Check how many assets are contributing to generate each service revenues ][iSv  
and identify the asset components )]([ iSvN  for all m  number of services.  
Step 3) Calculate ∑
=
=
m
i
iSN
iS
ks v
vxaV
1
)]([
][),(  for all asset components n  in the same network 
layer.  Apply same procedure for each network layer. 
Step 4) Add ),( xaV ks  to the previously calculated ),( xaV kf  to calculate ),( xaV kt .  
Step 5) Compare the asset value ),( xaV kt of each n  components and obtain the priorities 
)( kaprio per asset, from the biggest asset value downwards. 
Step 6) Repeat (Step 1) to (Step 6) for each network layer. 
 
Using this method, when a particular asset is generating a number of service values, the 
individual service value, generated in a year by a particular asset within the same layer, can 
be deduced. Such calculation method can be commonly applied to all network layers. By 
applying such method, when the network security risk is happened, the loss amount of 
damaged individual assets can be deduced based on the total asset value. Also, in this 
modeling technique, if the network uses multiple assets that have the same functions at a 
particular location on the network for the service consistency, the effect from an equivalent 
asset is additionally considered by the redundant design. For example, for server equipment 
designed for load balancing and multiple numbers of routers where detour courses are 
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provisioned for network troubles, the I-FCM (Improved Fuzzy Map) by Jong Pil Lee [9], who 
improved the FCM (Fuzzy Cognitive Map) by Kosko [10], were used to deduce the asset loss 
when a particular problem occurs on a specific asset. Different from the existing 
methodologies, such an approach incorporated the objectivity in asset value estimation. The 
proposed method [11] can calculate the relative importance of individual assets and the risk 
dispersion effect due to the redundant design of network assets. The calculated asset value 
implies the expected loss to the asset when risk occurs, and it can be expressed in a 
quantitative risk level calculated through risk analysis. In the proposed system, the 
quantitative risk level of assets is calculated in advance and stored at the asset management 
DB. It conducts the risk analysis by connecting the asset information with particular system 
information where risk has occurred or is expected to occur due to vulnerabilities and threats 
detected and analyzed by the N-IDS and VAS on a real-time basis. The asset information 
consists of the system name, operation system name, network IP, asset value information and 
other management information. 
 
3. Risk Analysis System Design 
 
3.1 Design Considerations 
In order to analyze the risk level of network assets on a real-time basis, it is essential to know 
the current distribution status of vulnerabilities and threats on the network. Also, it must be 
possible to effectively estimate how much risk can be created by specific threats. The 
proposed system utilizes N-IDS and VAS to collect threat and vulnerability information on 
the network. Also, it can be independently implemented on the system of a particular solution 
vendor by using an outside DB. As a result, the asset-related policies in the N-IDS system 
need not be set separately, so that the system can manage both the volume of typical harmful 
packets that may cause network interruption and other harmful packets that can directly have 
adverse effects on the network asset. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 2) Risk Analysis System Structure Diagram 
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Previous studies [12, 13], have mainly focused on the improvement of detecting the patterns of 
the individual threat originations. In cases where the offensive packets originate from an 
address that has been spoofed, such an approach is not effective. Focused on the targeted 
asset subjected to the threats, the objective of this study is to improve the interpretation 
method of the correlation of attributes and time information from the detected information to 
analyze what type of risk these threats can create on the relevant assets 
 
3.2 System Structure and Functions 
As shown in (Fig. 2), the proposed system is composed of a module () that collects detected 
information from the N-IDS and the VAS, a module () that separates the N-IDS log into 
server-related threats and network-related threats and analyzes each part, and an asset 
management module () DB that stores the expected loss values of individual assets. The 
functions of each module are as follows: 
 
3.2.1 Asset Management Module 
Typically, an asset is defined as anything that has value to the organization. Various 
classification standards and value assessment methods have been suggested. In this study, 
using the asset loss modeling technique [11], asset value information is estimated with the 
consideration of both physical value and intangible service value of systems that have 
information distribution and transfer functions on the network. Previously estimated 
individual asset value information is stored in the asset management DB with system 
management information (Fig .3). 
 
3.2.2 Log-collecting Module 
The proposed system uses detected threat and vulnerability information supplied by 
commercial N-IDS and VAS. In order to store each system log to an outside DB, it brings the 
data via a SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) trap. Although various elements 
can cause risks on a network, elements which are not detectable by N-IDS and VAS are not 
considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 3) System DB Structure 
 
The data needed for risk analysis from the collected log information of N-IDS and VAS is 
selected, and each composes the previously defined DB as shown in (Fig. 3). At this point, 
Sys. Name
Sys. O.S
Sys. IP
Service Value
Expected Loss
Sys. Admin.
Admin. Phone
E-Mail
Sys. Name
Sys. O.S
Sys. IP
Vul. Port
Vul. Protocol
Vul. Name
CVE-ID
VAS
Asset Mgt.
Sys. IP
Attack Time
Attack IP
Attack 포트
Target IP
Target Port
Attack Name
Attack Detection/
Termination Time
Protocol
Threat Level
CVE-ID
N-IDS
Vulnerability
Scanning
Real Time
Intrusion
Detection
IP, CVE-ID
  97
for data correlation analysis between N-IDS and VAS, IP address and CVE-ID (Common 
Vulnerability and Exposures-ID) can be used as a correlation key value 
 
3.2.3 Log Analysis Module 
Different from the approaches attempted in existing studies for N-IDS detection performance 
improvement, the log analysis module uses and analyzes the method that separates the 
server-related threat log and network-related threat log based on the attributes of the N-IDS 
log. It can optimize the server-related threat log through correlation analysis with the VAS 
log [14, 15]. The network-related threat log can show the risk development potentialities 
through analyses in accordance to the frequency of the threat generated during a certain 
period, based on attack targets and the forms of constantly generated threats. 
 
3.3 Analysis Algorithm 
This study suggests a method, which separates and analyzes N-IDS log information based on 
attributes and an efficient information representation method 
 
3.3.1 Server-related Threat Log Analysis 
If the N-IDS log correlates with the VAS log, the threat information that may create risks can 
be searched using the vulnerabilities of the server. Also, it could reduce the false positives 
known as N-IDS problems and decreases the management burden dealing with the false 
positives of the administrator. 
(Fig. 4) shows the forms, which the N-IDS log correlates with particular vulnerabilities 
detected by the VAS. However, the VAS DB has only the server software vulnerability 
information as shown in (Fig. 5) so that it could only optimize the threat log in regard to 
server vulnerabilities amongst the N-IDS log and requires a separate analysis technique for 
other network-related threats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 4) Correlation Diagram of VAS Log and N-IDS Log 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 5) Structure of VAS DB and N-IDS DB 
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3.3.2 Network-related Threat Log Analysis 
First, through the server-related threat log analysis, the remainder, excluded from the N-IDS 
log correlated with the server vulnerabilities, is left as part of the network-related threat log. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 6) Conceptual Diagram of Network Related Threat Log 
(Fig. 6) is a conceptual diagram of the network-related threat log analysis module. First, 
generate a DB record per asset subjected to threat with the log collected in order from the 
N-IDS and add on the frequency and types of threats developed during a time unit. At this 
point, threat type information is managed in a form shown in (Fig. 7). Every time a new 
threat to a particular asset occurs, add on to the same DB record in chronological order. 
 
 
(Fig. 7) Managed information Type of Threat 
 
3.3.3 Threat Level Calculation 
The N-IDS has information that contains degrees of risk previously established according to 
the attributes of detected individual threats [15]. Therefore, this study calculates the threat level 
for assets, using the risk degree (T) information established in the N-IDS for the frequency of 
threats to particular assets and individual threats. 
 
Threat Level = ∑
=
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iT
1
                                 (4) 
              (n: Number of threats occurred, Ti : i th threat risk level)  
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If the accumulated value of the estimated threat level during a unit time (previously 
determined time window) reaches a certain point in formula (4), it indicates that a problem 
may arise regarding the availability of the asset subjected to the threat. 
 
3.3.4 Risk Level Estimation and Alert Level Decision 
If the threats to particular assets exceed a certain level, the asset management module 
supplies the sum of the expected loss of the threatened assets as the estimated value of the 
risk level. However, determination of the alert level signaling according to the risk level from 
the network operation point of view shall be decided after considering both the threat level 
and risk level in formula (4). If a threat which may prevent the corresponding asset from 
functioning normally exists, a prompt reaction is necessary depending on its severity even for 
an asset with relative low risk level (asset value). Typically, the alert levels are classified into 
four levels (Critical, Major, Minor and Warning), and a threshold value for dividing each 
stage shall be established in advance by averaging the value of a threat level during a unit of 
time. 
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(Fig. 8) Flowchart for Alert level decision algorithm 
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4. Test and Evaluation Results 
 
4.1 Test Environment and Method 
The proposed system is tested in the network having total 1006 servers with 7 kinds of 
Operation Systems. For the test, we used commercial VAS and N-IDS system as shown 
below. With VAS we have scanned system vulnerabilities in the network at every 3 days and 
stored at DBMS. We also used N-IDS Log detected during 4 days at the same period. 
Proposed Log Analysis Algorithm showed that total number of N-IDS Log can be reduced to 
over 90% through classifying and integrating repeatedly detected N-IDS log according to its 
attribute. And we showed system processing results in case of intrusion detection that may 
cause serious impact for specific asset in the network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Test Result and Analysis 
Table (1) shows the results from the vulnerability analysis of 1006 systems, using VAS. From 
total of 32 systems, 15 vulnerabilities are detected. 
Table (2) shows the reduction of the N-IDS log according to the proposed method. In this 
case, all attacks generated for one day are divided per asset subjected to threats. The results 
showed a more than 90% reduction rate, and this implies that many threats conduct repeated 
attacks to particular assets.  
 
(Table 1) Results from the VAS Inspection 
Vulnerability for execution of telnet service 6 
Vulnerability in telnet service information provision 5 
Vulnerability in setting http server of Cisco router 5 
Vulnerability in daytime 4 
Vulnerability in opening of X server port 2 
Vulnerability in ICMP timestamp request and others 10 
Total 32 
 
(Table 2) Results from the Reduction of Threat Alarm  
Time N-IDS Thrt. Alrm. 
Proposed 
system 
VAS-related
Thrt. Alrm Changes 
2004-01-20  1,037 30 1 97.1  
2004-01-22  111 3 0 97.3  
2004-01-23  122 4 0 96.7  
2004-01-24  238 11 0 95.4  
 
In relation to alert level signaling, the log analysis results were expressed in a form shown in 
(Fig. 9) in order to deduce the threat development form to the corresponding asset from the 
perspective of threat subjected asset and the potentiality of risk development. 
 
? N-IDS : WinsTechnet Co.  Sniper 3.0 
? VAS  : NileSoft Co.  SecuGuard NSE 1.2 
? DBMS : MS SQL 200 
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(Fig. 9) Alert information Print Screen Based on Assets 
 
(Fig. 9) shows the information of an asset which is susceptible to critical severity. (Fig.10) 
additionally gives detailed and timely arranged threat occurrence information when a specific 
row showing critical severity is expanded by clicking leftmost plus sign. 
 
If threat level exceeds threshold value, as illustrated in (Fig.10), asset information (expected 
service loss value) given by asset management DB is automatically provided to the operator’s 
console. The operator can quickly identify where the specific threat happens and can assume 
whether the threat may cause risk or not. 
 
 
(Fig. 10) Extended Threat information Print Screen 
 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
Although most systems implemented with risk analysis methodologies offer procedures and 
methods that broadly consider the vulnerability of individual assets and threat elements from 
the managerial, physical and technical perspectives, they are not able to offer a function 
which estimates the risk level faced by the assets according to the changes being undergone 
by threat elements from the Internet and the software vulnerability of assets on a real-time 
basis. In order to solve these problems, this study proposes the design idea and experiment 
results of the system, which effectively detects network- and server-related threats using 
information supplied by commercial N-IDS and VAS that enables real-time based risk 
analysis. Through the tests, when the existing N-IDS log information are separated into 
server-related threats and network-related threats, and when they are correlated by the N-IDS 
and VAS, the threat log can be reduced by more than 90%, compared to individually operated 
cases. Moreover, by improving the threat detection capability and threat attribute analysis 
function, the system was constructed to predict expected risk levels on a real-time basis when 
certain points are reached. In order to increase accuracy on the risk analysis information, the 
following studies are further required in the future: application of standard transporting data 
format IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format), correlation analysis of 
individual system logs for optimizing threat warnings and methods for establishing criteria 
for categorizing threat warning levels. 
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